Why India Embraces Russia
India's avuncular prime minister Narendra Modi is famous for his hugs. Or some would say: infamous.
When India’s prime minister Narendra Modi met Russia's Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin in July, he was photographed hugging the Russian dictator—even as NATO leaders were meeting in Washington to discuss the Ukraine war. Six weeks later, he was photographed hugging Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv. What gives?
The Indian Century Roundtable has just published a landmark paper by Prof. Ramesh Thakur explaining “India’s Shifting Balance of Interests Vis-à-vis Russia”:
Prof. Thakur, a former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, is Emeritus Professor in the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University, a Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and a Senior Scholar of the Brownstone Institute. He is an expert on both Russian/Soviet and Indian international relations. We couldn’t ask for a better guide to the topic than him.
In his paper, Prof. Thakur writes that:
Outsiders often fail to understand what drives democratic India’s intimate ties with authoritarian Russia because they don’t see the world as viewed through Indian eyes and minds. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, India’s stance has both puzzled and irritated Western friends and commentators but is consistent with the trajectory of India’s foreign policy that seeks to balance a range of interests and principles in bilateral relations and multilateral forums. The US is India’s single most important global partner and there is a broad national consensus underpinning that. Yet it is also in India’s interest to remain engaged with other non-Western countries and groupings in pursuit of strategic autonomy.
He traces the India-Russia relationship back to the Cold War, a time when the United States was not always friendly to India, and indeed armed and trained India’s arch-rival, Pakistan. Prof. Thakur writes that in this period “the intimacy of the Indo–Soviet relationship was based on conjunctions of political, military and economic interests.” Nonetheless, according to Prof. Thakur,
The relationship was an ideological misfit from the start. One country was the world’s largest democracy with a bewildering myriad of political parties (including several variants of the communist party), competing trade unions and a robust press. The other was the most powerful communist state where the party claimed a monopoly of political and trade union activity and the press was entirely subservient to the interests of the ruling regime. Marxist ideology is the antithesis to the caste-dominated majority Hindu society of India. Culture and education turned Indian minds to the West rather than to the Soviet Union.
After the dramatic events of 1990-1991, which included not only the breakup of the Soviet Union but also the end of India’s “license Raj” and the opening of the Indian economy, the India-Russia relationship became more transactional. Prof. Thakur writes that “India scrambled to readjust to the changed unipolar world and recalibrate relations with the US while still heavily dependent on Soviet military supplies.” These changes ushered in three decades during which the United States was eager to improve relations with India—and to develop India as a market for military exports. This period of accommodation and courtship came to an end with Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Overt aggression by Russia, China, and (it must be remembered) the United States in various conflicts around the world has led India to be more circumspect about its partnerships and relationships. And not only India. Prof. Thakur reminds us that:
In a world characterised by such great-power behaviour, countries outside the rivalry between the democratic West and key authoritarian states judge their own long-term interests lies in minimising the chances of a major power war, protecting the fragile nuclear peace, creating a rules based order that is respected by all powers and in the meantime hedging their bets against geopolitical shocks in their own immediate region. The lodestar of their foreign policy will continue to be the safety, security, prosperity and wellbeing of their own people first.
As Prof. Thakur explains:
When making decisions, governments must strive for a balance among different sectors and groups domestically, among different nations and groups internationally, and between material interests and ethical principles. India resents and reacts irritably to being lectured by Westerners on foreign policy moralism because it is not and never has been prepared to outsource the calculation of its balance of interests on any issue to foreigners.
Indian commentators never tire of pointing out that Europe spends more on Russian gas than India spends on Russian oil. Even more ironic is the fact that Europe buys Russian oil back from India in the form of refined petroleum and diesel fuel. Yet Western commentators continue to malign India for importing discounted Russian oil, despite the fact that India (with a GDP per capita of USD $2800) can much less afford the luxury of choosing its suppliers than the European Union (with $42,500).
On balance, India tends to be a force for stability in the world. India may not always condemn aggression, but it never supports aggression. When it comes to the Ukraine war, India may buy weapons from Russia, but it doesn't sell weapons to Russia. Most of all, much like Australia, the European Union, or indeed the United States, India sees no reason to take sides in conflicts where its own interests are not at stake.
Prof. Thakur’s paper is a must-read for anyone who has been mystified by India’s relationship with Russia or Modi’s embrace of Putin. It lays out the history and explains the logic of Indian foreign policy-making. And it brings us closer to a genuine understanding of India. Once again, the paper can be read online or downloaded as a PDF from the Indian Century Roundtable website at:
I’m sure that you will enjoy the paper as much as I did.
I started the Indian Century Roundtable think tank almost two years ago with help from members of the Indian-Australian community. Since then, the organization has raised enough money to pay for professional services, establish a small reserve, and (most importantly) commission research. Prof. Thakur’s paper on “India’s Shifting Balance of Interests Vis-à-vis Russia” is our fourth paper, following papers from:
For me, the Roundtable is an entirely volunteer (that is: unpaid) effort. But even with me contributing my time for free, the organization does have expenses. We receive no government assistance, of any kind, from any government. Nor does my university contribute. Instead, we rely entirely on the more than 500 people who have given their own money to support the Indian Century Roundtable. If you would like to support our work, and you are financially able to do so, please consider donating at:
The Indian Century Roundtable is now a going concern and an established feature of the global India-focused think tank ecosystem. We are financially stable. But we are not yet at the point where we can hire even a single staff member. I’m happy to give my time for free, but some (paid) support staff would be very welcome. If you or anyone you know would like to sponsor our work at a level that would allow me to hire one or more full-time staff members, please do be in touch. Until then, thank you for your well-wishes, and be sure to read Prof. Thakur’s paper!
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